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I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment's rich tradition' reflects an unresolved state
of tension, inherent in all societies, between individual freedom and
collective goals.2 Although worded in unconditional terms,3 the first
amendment does not guarantee absolute freedom of speech.4 Often,
1. For an enlightening survey of this tradition, see H. KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY
TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (J. Kalven ed. 1988).
2. Alternatively, individual freedom might be characterized as a collective goal in the
sense that all members of a society may want individuals to be free. This objective meets no
resistance as long as an individual's exercise of his freedoms does not collide with the society's
other commonly held values. It is precisely those instances of conflict, however, that make up
the rich case history of the first amendment.
3. The first amendment reads in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 4 (1981). Even Justice Hugo Black, widely
regarded as the champion of an absolute interpretation of the first amendment, acknowledged
some level of limitation by distinguishing speech and conduct:
The First Amendment, I think, protects speech, writings, and expression of views
in any manner in which they can be legitimately and validly communicated. But
I have never believed that it gives any person or group of persons the
constitutional right to go wherever they want, whenever they please, without
regard to the rights of private or public property or to state law.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 166 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). For additional insight
into Justice Black's views on the first amendment, see JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE FIRST
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society's desire to preserve commonly held values' delimits an indi-
vidual's exercise of his first amendment rights. Because of these
ingrained restrictions, the United States Supreme Court must engage
in repeated line drawing between the individual's and society's com-
peting values. In articulating the bases of its judgments, the Court
has devised numerous tests.6 Over the years, the Court has increas-
AMENDMENT (E. Dennis, D. Gillmor & D. Grey eds. 1978). Professor Alexander Meiklejohn
qualified the absolute scope of the first amendment along a different dimension. According to
Professor Meiklejohn, the first amendment "protects the freedom of those activities of thought
and communication by which we 'govern.'" Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Abso-
lute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255. After enumerating the activities required for self-govern-
ment-understanding the issues facing the nation, passing judgment on how the government
handles those issues, and devising methods for improving upon the government's handling of
the issues-he stated: "Now it is these activities, in all their diversity, whose freedom fills up
'the scope of the First Amendment.' These are the activities to whose freedom it gives its
unqualified protection." Id.
5. Paramount among these values is the preservation of public order. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who called
the City Marshal a "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist"); see also infra notes 53-
55 and accompanying text. Protection of children is another value that consistently takes
precedence over first amendment claims. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(sustaining an FCC order granting a father's complaint against a radio station based on his and
his young son's hearing of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue); see also H. KALVEN,
JR., supra note 1, at 54-59. The United States Supreme Court has also shown heightened
concern when, in the Justices' perception, free speech claims threaten the integrity of the
nation, particularly in times of war. The line of cases utilizing the clear and present danger
test exemplify this preoccupation. See infra note 6.
6. Indeed, four early first amendment cases set the stage for this approach with the
development of the clear and present danger test. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Each of these World War I cases
presented an appeal of a political speech conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917. Even
though the Court upheld all four convictions, these cases played a crucial role in the formative
stages of first amendment jurisprudence. In the majority opinion in Schenck, Justice Holmes
first articulated the test: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck, 249 U.S.
at 52. Writing for the majority in Frohwerk, Justice Holmes again asserted: "[W]e have
decided in Schenck v. United States, that a person may be convicted of a conspiracy to obstruct
recruiting by words of persuasion." Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206. In Debs, Justice Holmes
further discussed how a bad effect precluded speech protection:
[T]he opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect would be to
obstruct recruiting. If that was intended and if, in all the circumstances, that
would be its probable effect, it would not be protected by reason of its being part
of a general program and expressions of a general and conscientious belief.
Debs, 249 U.S. at 215. Finally, speaking for the dissent in Abrams, Justice Holmes restated the
test:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify pun-
ishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may punish
speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that
it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States con-
stitutionally may seek to prevent.
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ingly relied on the application of these tests as a technique for decid-
ing first amendment cases.7 This form of adjudication, however,
presents treacherous pitfalls. At the test formulation stage, the
method involves the Court's acceptance of various fictions regarding
societal interests. For example, in devising the clear and present dan-
ger test,8 the Court implicitly assumed that society's view coincided
with the Court's own notion of which "substantive evils"9 permit the
state to silence the speaker. Similarly, in the area of obscenity, the
Court has attempted, 10 and failed," to develop a test in a way that
Abrams, 249 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In 1951, the Court adopted Chief Judge
Learned Hand's reformulation of the test: "'In each case [courts] must ask whether the grav-
ity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.'" Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (quoting
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950) (affirming convictions of Communist Party
members for violations of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670
(1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1988)))).
Obscenity is another first amendment area where the Court has articulated tests. In 1957,
Justice Brennan announced the test for obscenity as: "[Wihether to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, later restated the Roth test as follows:
[I]t must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of
the Court). In 1973, Chief Justice Burger reworked the Roth-Memoirs obscenity standard into
the following three-part test:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted).
Two additional tests that are central to the thesis of this Comment, the O'Brien test and
the Clark test, are discussed in Section II of this Comment.
7. Indeed, the Court premised its adjudication of the two cases that are the subject of this
Comment on tests. The use of tests in first amendment cases goes hand in hand with the
"categorizing" and "balancing" techniques of adjudication. The former involves definitional
line drawing, while the latter requires weighing the individual's and the state's interests. See
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975) (discussing the O'Brien test in
connection with these techniques).
8. For a discussion of the clear and present danger test, see supra note 6.
9. Abrams, 249 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
10. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418; Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
11. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-74 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging the futility of any attempt to devise a workable obscenity test).
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reflects both the moral concerns and the free speech interests of
society.
Having made various assumptions at the test formulation stage,
the Court must then indulge in the additional fiction of fitting the
particular circumstances of a specific case within the parameters of
the previously chosen test. In this conforming process, the Court may
disregard significant indicia, peculiar to the speaker, which are essen-
tial for sensitive first amendment adjudication. As a consequence, the
Court runs the risk of obtaining contradictory results when adjudicat-
ing substantively comparable free speech claims.
Nowhere is this danger more apparent than in the cases that are
the subject of this Comment: Texas v. Johnson,12 which upheld flag
burning as speech guaranteed by the first amendment; and Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 3 which rejected a rock band's claim that the
imposition of a city's sound amplification system and technician dur-
ing musical performances abridged speech guaranteed by the first
amendment. The Court decided both cases within a day of each other
at the end of the 1988-89 Term.' 4 Although the Court reached con-
trary results, in many important ways the cases presented analogous
facts and implicated similar freedom of speech issues. 5 Each case
involved outrageous, attention-grabbing conduct by the speaker:
burning the American flag; playing disturbingly loud music. In each
case, the conduct occurred in a public setting: flag burning in front of
Dallas City Hall; a rock concert at the Naumberg Bandshell in New
York's Central Park. The messages that the speakers sought to con-
vey implicated political protest speech: the flag burner's message was
anti-Reagan; the rock band's message was anti-racist. Finally, each
case presented a first amendment challenge to the validity of local
laws: Texas' flag desecration statute; New York City's bandshell use
ordinance. Moreover, just as Texas' statute interfered with the flag
burner's symbolic speech by prohibiting flag desecration to convey a
political message, New York's ordinance interfered with the rock
band's musical expression by imposing on its performance an extrane-
ous sound amplification system and technician. Thus, each case
called for first amendment protection of speakers who were similarly
situated in terms of their unconventional positions, their utilization of
outrageous public conduct to convey political messages, and their suf-
12. 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
13. 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2760 (1989).
14. The decisions were announced on June 21 and June 22, respectively.
15. The factual details and issues presented in the two cases appear in Section III of this
Comment. An analysis of the opinions appears in Section IV.
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fering from state impingement on those messages as a result of state
attempts to regulate outrageous conduct.
Given these similarities, a consistent approach to the first amend-
ment would require the Court to afford the same level of protection to
the speakers in both cases. The Court, however, achieved opposite
results in these cases-shielding the flag burner, but forsaking the
rock band. Why? This Comment argues that the Court's uneven per-
formance stems from its reliance on tests to determine first amend-
ment issues. By selecting two different tests to adjudicate these
cases,16 the Court followed diverging doctrinal paths, which led to
different results. 17 To elucidate how the use of tests without sensitiv-
ity to the speaker threatens the integrity of the first amendment, this
Comment examines the rationale of each opinion and questions the
Court's selection and application of tests in the two cases.
Section II of this Comment provides both a background overview
of flag desecration and a survey of the two tests respectively employed
by the Court in Texas v. Johnson and Ward v. Rock Against Racism.
Section III presents the factual settings and issues of the two subject
cases, as well as the substantive similarities between the two cases.
Section IV examines the Court's opinions and addresses the contrary
outcomes of the cases in terms of the Court's use of first amendment
tests. As a result of this analysis, this Comment concludes that the
United States Supreme Court decided the flag burning case correctly,
but the park concert case incorrectly, underscoring the proposition
that mechanical application of tests is an undesirable technique in first
amendment adjudication.
II. PERSPECTIVE
A. Background on Flag Desecration
United States Supreme Court adjudication of flag cases dates
back to the beginning of this century. As early as 1907, the United
States Supreme Court confronted its first flag desecration case, Halter
v. Nebraska."- The controversy arose from the use of the American
16. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court applied the test formulated in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court applied the test
announced in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
These tests are discussed in Section II of this Comment, and the Court's present application of
these tests is discussed in Section IV.
17. The Court's choice of tests may be characterized either as accidental-based on
superficially different factual patterns--or conditioned by precedent, or, more skeptically, as
deliberate and outcome determinative. For a discussion of these concerns, see infra text
accompanying notes 260-65.
18. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
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flag as an advertisement on a bottle of beer, in violation of a 1903
Nebraska flag desecration statute. 19 The Court found the Nebraska
statute constitutional as it pertained to the narrow purpose of forbid-
19. Id. at 38. Flag desecration statutes have played a major role in the adjudication of flag
cases. In 1907, when Halter v. Nebraska was decided, 31 states had enacted flag desecration
statutes. Id. at 39 n.1. In 1989, when Texas v. Johnson was decided, the number of states with
flag desecration statutes had risen to 48. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2551 n.1 (1989)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). A number of states modeled their flag laws after the Uniform
Flag Act, approved in 1917 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. See Rosenblatt, Flag Desecration Statues: History and Analysis; 1972 WASH. U.L.Q.
193, 196-97. The Uniform Flag Act reads as follows:
AN ACT
To PREVENT AND PUNISH THE DESECRATION, MUTILATION OR IMPROPER
USE OF THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THIS STATE,
AND OF ANY FLAG, STANDARD, COLOR, ENSIGN OR SHIELD AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Section 1. [Definition.] The words flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, as
used in this act, shall include any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, or copy,
picture or representation thereof, made of any substance or represented or
produced thereon, and of any size, evidently purporting to be such flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield of the United States or of this state, or a copy, picture or
representation thereof.
Sec. 2. [Desecration.] No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or
display:
(a) place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or
shield of the United States or of this state, or authorized by any law of the United
States or of this state; or
(b) expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield
upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which
shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure,
mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement; or
(c) expose to public view for sale, manufacture, or otherwise, or to sell, give
or have in possession for sale, for gift or for use for any purpose, any substance,
being an article of merchandise, or receptacle, or thing for holding or carrying
merchandise, upon or to which shall have been produced or attached any such
flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, in order to advertise, call attention to,
decorate, mark or distinguish such article or substance.
Sec. 3. [Mutilation.] No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy,
trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield.
Sec. 4. [Exceptions.] This statute shall not apply to any act permitted by
the statues of the United States (or of this state), or by the United States Army
and Navy regulations, nor shall it apply to any printed or written document or
production, stationery, ornament, picture or jewelry whereon shall be depicted
said flag, standard, color, ensign or shield with no design or words thereon and
disconnected with any advertisement.
Sec. 5. [Penalty.] Any violation of Section Two of this act shall be a
misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of not more than ....... dollars. Any
violation of Section Three of this act shall be punishable by a fine of not more
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ding the use of "the flag for advertising articles of merchandise."'2
Additionally, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, embarked on a
discussion of more general purposes that the statute might serve. He
expressed approval for state regulations reflecting "that to every true
American the flag is the symbol of the Nation's power, the emblem of
freedom in its truest, best sense."21 Justice Harlan also favored state
legislation generally aimed at "cultivat[ing] a feeling of patriotism
among the people."22 For almost a century, the Court has not dis-
turbed the narrow Halter ruling that the state's interest in the flag
surpasses an individual's lower interest in commercial speech.23 How-
than ....... dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than ..... days, or by
both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.
Sec. 6. [Inconsistent Acts Repealed.] All laws and parts of laws in conflict
herewith are hereby repealed.
Sec. 7. [Interpretation.] This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its
general purpose and to make uniform the laws of the states which enact it.
Sec. 8. [Name of the Act.] This act may be cited as the Uniform Flag Law.
Sec. 9. (Time of Taking Effect.] This act shall take effect ..... days after
NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwENTY-SEVENTH
ANNUAL MEETING, 323-24 (1917).
The Texas statute implicated in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537 n.l, however, did not
resemble the Uniform Flag Act. The Texas legislature had enacted Section 42.09 of Texas
Penal Code in 1973 to replace a 1925 flag desecration statute. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 42.09 practice commentary - 1973 (Vernon 1989). The current Texas statute reads:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or
more persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Id. § 42.09.
20. Halter, 205 U.S. at 45. The Halter decision preceded Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), which applied the first amendment to the states through incorporation into the
fourteenth amendment. I4 at 666. Arguably, in declaring the Nebraska statute
constitutional, Halter did not address the flag desecration issue in light of the first
amendment's applicability to state laws. Yet, Halter continues to be cited in cases involving
state flag desecration statutes. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2552 (1989)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 418 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
21. Halter, 205 U.S. at 43.
22. Id.
23. Under generally accepted first amendment theory, commercial speech deserves less
protection than political speech. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989)
(upholding a State University of New York regulation prohibiting the holding of Tupperware
parties in school dormitories); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a city
regulation prohibiting the distribution of commercial and business advertising handbills). But
see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (affirming the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision that a public transit system could ban political advertising from its buses
1990] 1039
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ever, the broader scope of the Halter dicta-that a state-sponsored
message regarding the flag may supersede all speech interests-was
definitely put to rest in Texas v. Johnson.24 Nevertheless, the emo-
tional appeal of Justice Harlan's sentiments concerning the flag issue
has persisted. Indeed, in his Johnson dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cites the Halter opinion with approval.2"
In 1943, while the country was engaged in World War II, the
role of the national flag again came under the scrutiny of the United
States Supreme Court. In Board of Education v. Barnette,26 the Court
chose substance over form by striking down a West Virginia statute
requiring school children to salute the flag. Justice Jackson squarely
framed the issue presented by the case as whether "compulsory meas-
ures toward 'national unity' are constitutional. '2  Echoing Justice
Harlan's patriotic fervor in Halter, but unwilling to be blinded by it,
Justice Jackson acknowledged that "[t]he case is made difficult not
because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag
involved is our own."' 29  The Court's decision against compulsion
reflects the first amendment's repugnance for state-imposed ortho-
doxy in matters of opinion, even when the symbolic stakes are high.3°
At the same time, the Court left the door open for yet undiscovered
circumstances that might permit an exception to this blanket condem-
nation. 31 By allowing the possibility of overriding governmental con-
cerns, the Court foreshadowed the balancing approach utilized in the
two cases that are the subject of this Comment.32
while allowing commercial advertising). Justice Rehnquist pointed to the inconsistency
between the Lehman holding and the Court's traditional approach to commercial speech in his
dissent in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), a
case decided in the same term in which Lehman was decided. The Court's latest
pronouncement on commercial speech, however, seems to preserve the lower level of
protection for commercial speech that was originally advanced in Chrestensen. Fox, 109 S. Ct.
at 3033.
24. 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2-542-48 (1989).
25. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
26. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
27. Id. at 642.
28. Id. at 640 (quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Globitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940)).
29. Id. at 641.
30. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id. at 642.
31. "If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
us." Id. In a footnote to this statement, however, Justice Jackson offered the example of
military service as an instance where the government might compel duties abridging freedoms
ordinarily claimed by civilians. Id. at 642 n.19.
32. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, utilized such an approach in evaluating the
state interests advanced by Texas to justify the flag burning conviction in Johnson. Similarly,
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Ward v. Rock Against Racism evaluated the interests
1040
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Early challenges to flag desecration statutes centered on their
prohibitions against using the flag for advertising.3 Indeed, Halter is
the paradigm of such cases. As the country became involved in
increasingly controversial issues such as the Civil Rights Movement
and the Vietnam War, however, flag desecration as a form of political
protest became more popular.34 During this period, three cases
involving flag desecration statutes came before the United States
Supreme Court: Street v. New York, 5 Smith v. Goguen,a6 and Spence
v. Washington.37 In each of these cases, the Court avoided the ques-
tion of whether flag desecration is protected speech, reversing the con-
victions on other grounds.38 These three decisions set the stage for
asserted by the City of New York in imposing sound amplification guidelines on concert
sponsors. These opinions are discussed in Section IV of this Comment.
33. Rosenblatt, supra note 19, at 197.
34. This trend prompted Congress to pass a federal flag desecration statute, Act of July 5,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-381, 82 Stat. 291 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988)). The legislative
history contains a report by the Senate Judiciary Committee stating: "The instant bill is
occasioned by a number of recent public flag-burning incidents in various parts of the United
States and in foreign countries by American citizens." S. REP. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
1669.(reference table), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2507, 2508. The
Senate Committee also remarked on the absence of federal legislation concerning flag
desecration other than that applicable to the District of Columbia. Id. (commenting on 4
U.S.C. § 3 (1988)). In light of recent events, the Committee saw a need to remedy the
omission in order to protect the flag both in the United States and abroad. Id. The text of 18
U.S.C. § 700, as enacted, entitled "Desecration of the flag of the United States; penalties" is as
follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the United States by
publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(b) The term "flag of the United States" as used in this section, shall include
any flag, standard colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of either, or of
any part or parts of either, made of any substance or represented on any
substance, of any size evidently purporting to be either of said flag, standard,
color, or ensign of the United States of America, or a picture or a representation
of either, upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars and the stripes, in any
number of either thereof, or of any part or parts of either, by which the average
person seeing the same without deliberation may believe the same to represent
the flag, standards, colors, or ensign of the United States of America.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of Congress to deprive any State, territory, possession, or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of jurisdiction over any offense over which it
would have jurisdiction in the absence of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988). But see infra note 167 (recent amendments to the statute).
35. 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (burning and speaking contemptuously about the flag).
36. 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (wearing trousers with a flag sewn to their seat).
37. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam) (displaying a flag with a peace symbol affixed).
38. The avoidance of the issue may be justified in terms of judicial method. A dictate of
judicial economy is that an issue should not be decided unless it is squarely presented and
necessary to determine the outcome of the case. "The Court will not 'anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. It is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
1990] 1041
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the Johnson case: Street foreshadowed the balancing of interests
approach used by the majority in overturning Johnson's conviction;
the dissent in Goguen presaged the arguments brought out by the
Texas v. Johnson dissent; and the per curiam opinion in Spence, while
not strong in doctrinal value, presented a sensitive discussion of the
flag issue.
In Street v. New York, the Court reversed Street's conviction
under New York's flag desecration statute39 for burning and speaking
contemptuously about the flag of the United States.' On June 6,
1966, Sidney Street, a patriotic black man, left his apartment carrying
the American flag which he displayed on national holidays, walked to
a nearby intersection, and set the flag on fire.4 1 Street's act was moti-
vated by news of the shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith.42
When interrogated by a New York police officer, Street answered:
"Yes; that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that happen to Meredith
we don't need an American flag."' 43 The charge filed against Street
accused him of both burning the flag and shouting his complaint
about Meredith's fate.44 The Court reversed Street's conviction on
the possibility that it rested on his "publicly speaking defiant or con-
temptuous words about the flag."45
In evaluating whether Street could constitutionally be convicted
for his words, the Court listed four governmental interests that the
conviction might further: (1) preventing incitement of others to com-
mit unlawful acts; (2) preventing the utterance of inflammatory words
that would provoke others to retaliate and cause a breach of the
peace; (3) protecting the sensibilities of passersby; and (4) assuring
proper respect for the national emblem." On the facts of the case,
and in light of prior first amendment law, none of these interests
could be sustained when balanced against Street's first amendment
case.'" Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). Not until the Johnson case was the issue of flag desecration properly before the
Court.
39. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(d) (McKinney 1988). The statute provides in part: "Any
person who ... [s]hafl publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt
upon either by words or act, ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." This statute superseded
the identical language of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425(16)(d) (1909) in 1967. Street had
originally been convicted under the earlier statute. Street, 394 U.S. at 577-79, 578 n. I.
40. Street, 394 U.S. at 594.
41. Id. at 578; People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967).
42. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. at 578.
43. Id at 579.
44. Id.
45. Id at 588, 594.
46. Id at 590-91.
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rights.47
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the legiti-
macy of the first state interest analyzed in Street-preventing incite-
ment.48  To suppress a speaker under the guise of preventing
incitement, the Court requires a strong showing of the speaker's advo-
cacy of concrete and immediate lawless action.49 Using this criterion,
the Street Court found that Street's words did not rise to the neces-
sary level required for suppression because he did not urge anyone to
do anything unlawful.5 0 Rather, the Court concluded that Street's
expression fell into the category of "public advocacy of peaceful
change in our institutions"5 '-the quintessential form of speech pro-
tected by the first amendment.
52
The second interest considered by the Court in Street has its
roots in the "fighting words" doctrine announced in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire.53 According to Chaplinsky, words "likely to pro-
voke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of
the peace," fall outside the first amendment's protective circle.54 The
requirement of an impending breach of the peace, like present incite-
ment, serves to narrow the category of unprotected speech to those
expressions presenting a tangible and immediate threat to the social
order.55 Again, the Court found that Street's remarks were not suffi-
ciently inflammatory to rise to the level of "fighting words." 56
The Court addressed the third state interest-protecting pass-
ersby from shock-rather briefly. The Court noted that shock is a
relative function of cultural values; therefore, a determination of what
constitutes shock inherently requires an evaluation of the content of
the speech.5 7 Given this requirement, the Court summarily dismissed
47. Id at 594.
48. As used by the Court, the term "incitement" is synonymous with subversive advocacy.
For a scholarly discussion tracing the Court's contouring of this issue up through the decision
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), see H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 1,
at 77-236.
49. mhe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
50. Street, 394 U.S. at 591.
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. See H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 1, at 240.
53. 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see also H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 1, at 78-80.
54. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574; see also H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 1, at 78-80.
55. See H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 1, at 80, 236.
56. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
57. Id
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any interference with the expression of ideas "merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.158
The final state interest scrutinized by the Court in Street goes to
the heart of flag desecration controversies: May the state punish a
citizen who fails to show respect for the flag as the national symbol? 59
In a totalitarian system of government, the state is free to compel the
outward allegiance of its citizens by any means.' The totalitarian
state is also free to punish any expression of dissent.6" Indeed, totali-
tarian regimes legitimize their actions under laws that empower them
to carry out human rights violations.62 As Justice Jackson made clear
in Board of Education v. Barnette, however, the ground rules are dif-
ferent under the first' amendment. 63 Relying on the decision in Bar-
nette that the state may not compel a flag salute, 6" the Court in Street
determined that the state may not inhibit "the freedom to express
publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which
are defiant or contemptuous. '65  The Court, however, reserved the
question addressed in Texas v. Johnson, commenting that it had "no
occasion to pass upon the validity of this conviction insofar as it was
sustained by the state courts on the basis that Street could be pun-
ished for his burning of the flag, even though the burning was an act
of protest.
66
Just as the majority's analysis in Street set the stage for the Texas
v. Johnson opinion, the dissent in Smith v. Goguen 67 was a rehearsal
for the Johnson dissent. Goguen was convicted under a Massachu-
58. Id. (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (reversing the conviction of a
speaker, who was virulently critical of various political and racial groups, under a breach of
the peace statute)). Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. discussed Terminiello and a similar case,
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (striking down a licensing scheme banning a Baptist
speaker who had ridiculed and denounced other religious beliefs), under the rubric of
"ideological fighting words." H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 1, at 80-88.
59. Street, 394 U.S. at 593.
60. See, e.g., Commentaries, UN Commission on Human Rights (1989), 42 REV. INT'L
COMMISSION JURISTS 20 (1989) (report of the 45th session discussing, inter alia,
disappearances, mercenaries, torture, and summary or arbitrary executions; and including
human rights status reports on countries such as: Afghanistan, Albania, Burma, Chile, Cuba,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, the Israeli-occupied territories, Southern Lebanon,
Romania, and South Africa); WuDunn, A Student's Body Is Honored with Tears of Horror and
Cries for Revenge; Crackdown in Beijing: The Students Grieve, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1989, at
A14, col. 1 (describing the beginning of the massacre of democracy demonstrators at
Tiananmen Square).
61. See supra note 60.
62. See generally H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 460-79 (1973).
63. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
64. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 594.
67. 415 U.S. 566, 591-604 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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setts flag misuse statute for wearing an American flag sewn to the seat
of his pants.6 The charge specified that Goguen "did publicly treat
contemptuously the flag of the United States."'69 Ignoring the larger
flag desecration issue, the Court affirmed the District Court for the
District of Massachusetts' reversal of the conviction based on the
vagueness of the statute.7 ° In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued
that the jury could not have convicted Goguen of treating the flag
contemptuously unless some marginal elements of symbolic speech
were involved in his wearing the flag where he did.7' Based on this
hypothesis, Justice Rehnquist proceeded to justify the conviction in
the face of first amendment concerns.72 The doctrinal and emotional
arguments encountered in this dissent reappear in Johnson.
The main doctrinal argument in the Goguen dissent is the con-
cept that even a privately owned flag is special property, whose use
the state may regulate. 73 Hence, the dissent asserted, flag laws are just
like zoning laws, copyright laws, and laws governing the use of con-
trolled drugs and firearms. 74 According to Justice Rehnquist, how-
ever, the state may go further than restricting a flag owner's property
rights. 75 The state may also assert "a peculiarly governmental interest
in property otherwise privately owned."' 76 This interest is akin to that
recognized for postage and revenue stamps, money, federal bank
notes, military uniforms, and service medals.77 Thus, Justice Rehn-
quist classified the flag as one more official instrument, copies of
which citizens may own subject to state-imposed use restrictions. The
effect of this state-ownership conceptualization of the flag is to make
the governmental interest in preserving the flag's physical integrity
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression. '78 Also presaging
his Texas v. Johnson dissent, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Goguen
included patriotic references to Benjamin Franklin, Justice Holmes,
Iwo Jima, the Star-Spangled Banner, and John Greenleaf Whittier's
68. Id. at 570. The Massachusetts statute reads in pertinent part: "Whoever publicly
bums or otherwise mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States . . . shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5
(West 1990).
69. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 570 (quoting app. 4).
70. Id at 571, 582.
71. Id. at 593.
72. Id. at 593-604.
73. Id at 594-96.
74. Id at 594-95.
75. Id at 595.
76. Id
77. Id. at 595-96.
78. Id. at 599.
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heroine, Barbara Frietchie. 9  The National Anthem and Whittier's
poem, "Barbara Frietchie," were quoted in full in the Johnson
dissent.80
Compared to Street and Goguen, the per, curiam opinion in
Spence v. Washington81 provides little doctrinal basis for the Texas v.
Johnson decision. Spence, however, contains one of the Court's most
sensitive articulations of what the flag desecration controversy repre-
sents. Spence hung an American flag, with a peace sign taped on it,
upside down from his window, thereby violating Washington's
improper flag use statute.82 His motive was to protest the extension of
the Vietnam War into Cambodia and the killing of four students dur-
ing an anti-war demonstration at Kent State University. 3 To the
Court, Spence's act was not one of "mindless nihilism" but "a pointed
expression of anguish.., about the then-current domestic and foreign
affairs of his government."8 4 The Court found that no state interest,
including that of "preserving the national flag as an unalloyed symbol
of our country,"85 superseded Spence's freedom of speech rights.8"
The Rehnquist dissent in Spence, 7 although not as forceful as the one
in Goguen, reiterated the conviction that the flag, as a "unique
national symbol,"'8 8 should be removed "from the roster of materials
that may be used as a background for communications."8 9
B. The O'Brien Test and the Clark Test
In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court not only followed the
analytical steps laid down in Street, Goguen, and Spence, but it also
79. Id. at 600-02.
80. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2549-50 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
81. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
82.. Id. at 406-07. The Washington statute reads in part:
No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display:
(1) Place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or
shield of the United States or of this state or authorized by any law of the United
States or of this state; or
(2) Expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield
upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which
shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure,
mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement ....
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86.020(l)-(2) (1988).
83. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410, 414 n.10.
84. Id. at 410.
85. Id. at 412.
86. Id. at 413-15.
87. Id. at 416-23.
88. Id. at 423.
89. Id
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considered the applicability of the O'Brien testy ° The following crite-
ria for first amendment scrutiny were announced in United States v.
O'Brien:91
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inciden-
tal restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.92
Professor John Ely has construed this passage as announcing a
three-step test for determining whether a governmental regulation
violates the first amendment.9 3 According to Professor Ely, the mid-
dle section of the test-whether "the governmental interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression"-performs an initial
classifying function.94 Only regulations that meet this criterion pro-
ceed to the scrutiny prescribed in the other two steps of the test-
whether the regulation "furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest" and whether the restrictions imposed on the speaker
are "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."9 "
Regulations that fail to pass the threshold inquiry are "switched onto
another track" that is "substantially more demanding."96 According
90. For a discussion of Texas v. Johnson, see infra Section IV.
91. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding the conviction of a draft card burner).
92. Id at 377.
93. See Ely, supra note 7, at 1483-84. Professor Ely discounted the requirement that a
regulation be "within the constitutional power of the government" as superfluous in light of
the substantiality criterion and the Court's broad notion of what constitutional power
encompasses. Id at 1483 n.10.
94. Id at 1484.
95. Id at 1483-84.
96. Id at 1484. According to Professor Ely, the O'Brien test is incomplete in the sense
that it does not provide criteria for evaluating regulations that are switched out of it and onto
the more demanding track. Id In Professor Ely's view, this gap is filled by an alternative
"categorizing approach elaborated in other decisions of the late Warren period." Id. Those
decisions are Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (overturning the
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act), and Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing the conviction of a young man for wearing in public a
jacket with the saying "Fuck the Draft"). Ely, supra note 7, at 1491-92. Professor Ely stated
that, after Brandenburg, "the expression involved in a given case either does or does not fall
within the described category, and if it does not it is protected." Id at 1491. The Court in
Cohen, Professor Ely added, "clarified[ ] the categorization approach it had adopted in
Brandenburg" by rejecting "attempts to punish 'offensive language.'" Id. at 1492-93.
Professor Laurence Tribe's "two track" analysis parallels Professor Ely's exposition. L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-94 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe classified
the Court's approach to first amendment questions as "track one" if the government's
purported attempt to abridge speech was "aimed at communicative impact," and "track two"
if the government regulation was "aimed at noncommunicative impact but nonetheless ha[d]
adverse effects on communicative opportunity." Id at 789-90. Track one regulations are
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to Professor Gerald Gunther, this "switching function" of the O'Brien
test amounts to a restatement of the "content-based/content-neutral"
distinction97 articulated by the Court in Police Department v. Mos-
ley :98 "[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its messages, its ideas, its subject mat-
ter, or its content." 99
The Mosley opinion also incorporates an equal protection notion
for speakers to whom the government makes available a public area-
the public forum:
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some
groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or
speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclu-
sions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and
may not be justified by reference to content alone.o
The doctrine of the public forum, as it has presently evolved,
played a crucial role in the Court's decision against the speaker in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism.101 Commentators generally credit
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. with coining the term "public forum."102
The doctrine has its roots10 3 in Justice Roberts' comment in Hague v.
CIO: 104
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
"unconstitutional unless government shows that the message being suppressed... falls on the
unprotected side of one of the lines the Court has drawn to distinguish those expressive acts
privileged by the first amendment from those open to government regulation with only
minimal due process scrutiny." Id at 791-92. Track two regulations are constitutional if they
do not "unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas." Id. at 792. This determination
requires balancing "the values of freedom of expression and the government's regulatory
interests.., on a case-by-case basis." Id
97. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1175 (11th ed. 1985).
98. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a Chicago ordinance barring picketing within 150 feet
of a school unless the picketing was peaceful and occurred in front of a school involved in a
labor dispute).
99. Id. at 95.
100. Id at 96.
101. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, discussed the characteristics of the
Naumberg Bandshell, where Rock Against Racism conducted its concerts, as follows: "Here
the Bandshell was open, apparently, 'to all performers; and we decide the case'as one in which
the Bandshell is a public forum for performances in which the government's right to regulate
expression is subject to the protections of the First Amendment." Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989) (emphasis added).
102. See Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis Content and
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (1984); Fiss, Kalven's
Way, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 4, 5 (1975).
103. Farber & Nowak, supra note 102, at 1221.
104. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and
must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and con-
venience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.'
Professor Kalven analogized permissible regulation in the public
forum to the parliamentary "Robert's Rules of Order. ' 'w° The
United States Supreme Court's equivalent term is "time, place and
manner restrictions."1 7 The Court's use of the term "time, place and
manner restrictions," however, predates even the Hague decision. In
Lovell v. Griffin,108 the Court overturned the conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness who had distributed religious literature without a license in
the city of Griffin. °9 The ordinance was unconstitutional, the Court
declared, because it "prohibit[ed] the distribution of literature of any
kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit
from the City Manager." 0 Although Justice Roberts had conceded
in Hague that the state could regulate the public forum for the sake of
preserving the comfort and convenience of its citizens,' the Lovell
Court balked at state regulations that would effectively close down the
forum.'1 2 The Court continued to chip away at wholesale state regu-
lation of the public forum in Schneider v. State,"3 this time scrutiniz-
ing the state's interest in promoting an environmental regulation.
105. Id at 515-16.
106. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 1,
12. Professor Alexander Meiklejohn originally endorsed the concept of the orderly conduct of
speech 'activities when describing "the traditional American town meeting" as the paradigm
for measuring "free political procedures." A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLMCAL FREEDOM 24 (1960).
He painted a vivid picture of a town meeting where a "chairman ... 'calls the meeting to
.order' . . .no one shall speak unless 'recognized by the chair'.. . debaters must confine their
remarks to 'the question before the house' ... [and if someone is] declared 'out of order'. . . he
may be 'denied the floor' or, in the last resort, 'thrown out' of the meeting.' Id. at 24-25.
107. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 97, at 1196 n.9.
108. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
109. Id. at 447-48, 452-53. The Lovell decision also extended first amendment protection
against "prior restraint" to handbilling. Id. at 451. For a discussion of the prior restraint
doctrine, see infra note 208.
110. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451.
111. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
112. Chief Justice Hughes disapproved of the ordinance's "broad sweep," arguing that it
"embrace[d] 'literature' in the widest sense" and was "comprehensive with respect to the
method of distribution." Lovell, 303 U.S. at 450-51. Consequently,"he declared the ordinance
"invalid on its face." Id. at 451.
113. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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In Schneider, the Court struck down a city ordinance that prohibited
handbilling in order to prevent littering. 11 4 The Court determined
that the city's interest in clean streets could not justify the abridgment
of constitutional rights securing free communication of
information. 1 15
These early exercises in defining the when, where, how, and why
of public forum control reflect the Court's original solicitude in pro-
tecting the public forum speaker. In Hague, Lovell, and Schneider,
the Court was concerned with guaranteeing speakers a minimum level
of access rather than simply providing them with equal treatment. 
1 16
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, however, the Court ratified the nar-
rower equal protection concept of public forum analysis117 adopted in
Mosley.118 In Ward, the Court applied its latest test on permissible
time, place, and manner restrictions in the public forum context, as
stated in Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence:1 9
Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is
subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have
often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid provided that
they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information. 120
On its face, the Clark test appears to continue the speech-protec-
tive tradition of the early public forum cases by scrutinizing regula-
tions for content neutrality, narrow tailoring, and a provision of
ample alternatives. When the Court applied the Clark test in Ward,
however, it relied on the city's treatment of other users of the
Naumberg Bandshell as one of the justifications for upholding the
city's sound amplification guidelines.12 ' Viewed through the lens of
114. Id. at 165.
115. Id. at 162.
116. Professor Gunther characterized these two levels of protection as the broad and the
narrow views of the public forum. G. GUNTHER, supra note 97, at 1196-99. He asserted that
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., the originator of the public forum nomenclature, endorsed the
"broad, guaranteed access view." Id. at 1199 n.5.
117. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
119. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In Clark, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a National
Park Service prohibition against overnight sleeping at Lafayette Park, located across from the
White House and the Washington Mall. Id. at 289-90. The group challenging the regulation
intended to dramatize the plight of homeless people, particularly in winter, by sleeping in tents
that the Park Service had permitted them to set up. Id. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 293.
121. The Court accepted a finding by the district court "that the performers who did use
the city's sound system in the 1986 season, in performances 'which ran the full cultural gamut
from grand opera to salsa to reggae,' were uniformly pleased with the quality of the sound
1050
FLAG BURNING YES, LOUD MUSIC NO
Ward, the Clark test may be said to endorse the weaker equal protec-
tion view of the public forum. In this sense, the Clark test has not
lived up to its characterization by the Court as being the equivalent of
the O'Brien test.122 Absent public forum connotations, the O'Brien
test calls for an examination of the state's treatment of the speaker as
an isolated individual. In the public forum context, on the other
hand, a court applying the Clark test may take into account the treat-
ment of similarly situated speakers.' 23 The resulting dichotomy in
first amendment protection becomes starkly obvious when comparing
the two cases that are the subject of this Comment. By characterizing
the public park concert case as occurring in a public forum 24 and
applying the Clark test in a narrow equal protection sense, the Court
initially embarked on a first amendment track that was less protective
of the speaker than the track followed in the flag burning case. More-
over, the Court applied different tests to the two cases despite the fact
that the flag burning had also occurred in a public area, 25 hence a
public forum. By including the speaker's location as a factor in its
test selection process only in Ward, the Court applied different tests,
which led to very different results.
III. THE FLAG BURNING CASE AND THE PARK CONCERT CASE
A. The Flag Burning Case: Texas v. Johnson
During the 1984 Republican National Convention, Gregory Lee
Johnson took part in a protest march through the streets of Dallas,
Texas.1 2 6 Johnson and his cohorts were denouncing the policies of
President Ronald Reagan and of several Dallas-based corporations,
emphasizing the aggravating effects of these policies on the threat of
nuclear war.' 27 Along the way, the protestors vandalized targeted
provided." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2752 (1989) (quoting Rock
Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
122. In Texas v. Johnson, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, asserted that the
O'Brien test was little if anything more than a restatement of the time, place, and manner
restrictions applied in public forum situations. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540-41
(1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)). In
the Court's view, therefore, a government interest survives the O'Brien threshold of being
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression" if and only if it meets the Clark requirement
that it be "justified without reference to the content of regulated speech." Id. Thus, only state
interests that remain free of the content-based suppressive taint should proceed to the weaker
level of scrutiny prescribed by both O'Brien and Clark.
123. Equal protection analysis of freedom of speech issues has the potential adverse effect of
justifying lower levels of speech protection on the basis of nondiscrimination.
124. See supra note 101.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 130-31.
126. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2536.
127. Id
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corporations' buildings. 128 One protestor-not Johnson-took an
American flag from one of the buildings. 1 29 The march ended in front
of Dallas City Hall. 130 At that point, Johnson set fire to the stolen
flag while the group chanted: "America, the red, white, and blue, we
spit on you. '"131 Despite the act's potential for violent confrontation,
no disruptions ensued.' 32 Some witnesses, however, claimed that they
were seriously offended by Johnson's burning of the flag.' 33 Johnson
was charged with desecration of a venerated object in violation of the
Texas Penal Code.134 A jury convicted Johnson of the desecration
charge and sentenced him to one year in prison and a fine of $2000.
3
Johnson appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District
of Texas.' 36 The court affirmed Johnson's conviction, overruling his
objections that the Texas statute violated his freedom of speech rights
under the first and fourteenth amendments. 37 Although the court
recognized that Johnson's act of burning the United States flag consti-
tuted symbolic speech protected by the first amendment, it found that
the interests advanced by the state-'"preventing breaches of the
peace and protection of the flag as a symbol of national unity"'131_
justified Johnson's conviction.' 39 After granting discretionary review,
however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both lower
courts and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal."4 The
court of criminal appeals determined that the state's interests, found
sufficiently important below, did not rise to the level necessary to jus-
tify an infringment of Johnson's first amendment rights.' 4' In an
opinion delivered by Justice Brennan, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that Johnson's conviction was not consistent





132. Id. at 2537.
133. Id. One of the witnesses collected the charred remains after the demonstration and
buried them in his backyard. Id. at 2536.
134. Id. at 2537. For the text of the statute, see supra note 19.
135. Johnson v. State, 706 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 755 S.W.2d 92
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd sub nor. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
136. Id. at 122.
137. Id. at 122-25.
138. Id. at 123.
139. Id. at 123-24.
140. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Texas v.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
141. Id. at 96-97.
142. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
1052
1990] FLAG BURNING YES, LOUD MUSIC NO 1053
advanced by the state143 and found that "Johnson's conduct did not
threaten to disturb the peace"" and that Johnson's right to engage in
political expression was paramount to the state's interest in preserving
the symbolism of the flag.14
B. The Park Concert Case: Ward v. Rock Against Racism
From 1979 to 1985, Rock Against Racism (RAR) sponsored
"yearly 'musical/political event[s]'" at the Naumberg Bandshell in
New York City's Central Park.'" RAR was an "unincorporated
association... 'dedicated to the espousal and promotion of anti-racist
views.' 117 Its annual events included musical group performances
and speakers who were members of groups opposed to racism. 148 In
1985, the city initially denied RAR a concert permit, citing noise and
crowd control problems experienced in past years. 149 After the city
and the rock group reached an agreement, however, the 1985 concert
went on at the Bandshell.'50 In March 1986, the city of New York
issued "Use Guidelines" for the Bandshell.15'- The extensive regula-
tions required all Bandshell concert sponsors to use the sound amplifi-
cation equipment and operating technician provided by the city. 52
RAR challenged the regulations, alleging a deprivation of its first
amendment rights, and the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York issued an injunction exempting RAR
143. Id. at 2541-44.
144. Id. at 2548.
145. Id.
146. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
147. Id. at 1348 (quoting plaintiff).
148. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d at 368.
149. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2750-51. The city had received
complaints about excessive noise during RAR's previous concerts from visitors to the adjacent
Sheep Meadow, a quiet area of the park, and from residents of Central Park West. Id. at 2750.
At the 1984 concert, the police cut off power to the sound system in response to noise
complaints, thereby causing the audience to become unruly and hostile. Id. Rock Against
Racism's brief, however, stated: "Sheldon Horowitz, the Special Events Director of the
Department of Parks admitted that he did not receive any complaints in 1985 about the RAR
event." Brief for Respondent at 8, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (No.
88-226) (citation to trial transcript omitted). Moreover, a Rock Against Racism concert
organizer claimed "that the Parks Department had released only three letters of complaint in
recent years." Greenhouse, High Court Upholds Noise Rule for the Central Park Bandshell
N.Y. Times, June 23, 1989, at BI, col. 2, B4, col. 6.
150. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2751.
151. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
152. Id. at 1351. Counsel for Rock Against Racism likened the regulation to "requiring all
violinists to use a city violin, [and] even if the city violin was [sic] a Stradivarius [, t]here will
always be some violinists who would rather use their own." Brief for Respondent at 19, Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (No. 88-226).
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from the "Use Guidelines" during its 1986 concert. 153 After a bench
trial, however, the court vacated the injunction as it pertained to the
Sound Amplification Guidelines (SAG).1 54 The district court found
that the city's interest in volume control was legitimate and that the
regulations were narrowly tailored to further that interest, despite the
fact that the regulations interposed the city's equipment and techni-
cian between the concert sponsors and the audience, thereby imping-
ing on the creative aspects of the music. 55
On RAR's appeal of the trial court's refusal to permanently
enjoin enforcement of the SAG, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded to the trial court for a modified order. 56 While conceding
that noise levels could be regulated, the court struck down the SAG
because the city had at its disposal less restrictive alternatives to fur-
ther its interest in volume control.1 57 The United States Supreme
Court reversed.15 8  In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, 59 the Court
found the Second Circuit's reliance on the least restrictive alternative
test misguided.' I The Court reaffirmed the appropriateness of scruti-
nizing the regulations to ensure that they were narrowly tailored to
achieve the state's interest in volume control, 61 but it foreclosed judi-
cial inquiry into available alternatives as a practical means of making
that determination.
1 62
C. Substantive Similarities Between the Two Cases
Thoughtful scrutiny of the situations represented by Ward and
Johnson reveals substantive similarities between the two cases. Both
speakers engaged in outrageous, attention-grabbing conduct. In each
case, the conduct occurred in a public setting, and the message con-
153. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. at 1351. The district court based its
decision to grant the preliminary injunction on the city's intention "to impose upon RAR a
sound system of unknown quality, seemingly under the sole control of an individual owing his
allegiance to a City contractor and not to RAR as sponsor of the event." Id.
154. Id. at 1360-61.
155. Id. at 1353.
156. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1988). The Second Circuit
"sustained the right of the city to limit volume of performances broadcast from the bandshell
to a level otherwise specified as reasonable." Id. The court, however, reversed the trial court's
order upholding "the SAG requirement of the use of a sound system furnished by the city and
operated by a technician designated by the city." Id.
157. Id. at 370-71.
158. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2760 (1989).
159. Id. at 2750.
160. Id. at 2753.
161. Id. at 2757.
162. Id. at 2762 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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veyed by each speaker implicated political protest. Moreover, each
case presented a first amendment challenge to the validity of a local
law that impinged on the speaker's message. The extent and signifi-
cance of these similarities make the two cases comparable in terms of
free speech demands; hence, they are deserving of equivalent degrees
of protection.
The outrageous quality of the flag burner's conduct was derived
entirely from the flag's symbolism. Symbols play an essential role in
human culture.163 The American flag is the embodiment of our
Nation's history.1" Throughout those two hundred years of history,
showing respect for the flag has been the outward expression of Amer-
icans' love of country and pride in its achievements.' 65  Respect for
the flag also conveys a feeling of gratitude to American soldiers who
have died in combat.'" The shock value of burning the flag lies in its
violation of these deeply held patriotic sentiments. 16' The offensive
163. See generally E. CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN (1944); F. DILLISTONE, THE POWER
OF SYMBOLS IN RELIGION AND CULTURE (1986); H. DUNCAN, SYMBOLS AND SOCIAL
THEORY (1969); R. WAGNER, SYMBOLS THAT STAND FOR THEMSELVES (1986).
164. See J. Moss, THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND SYMBOLISM 34-
40 (rev. ed. 1941); see also S. REP. No. 152, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. -, reprinted in 1989 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 610, 611-15.
165. See supra note 164.
166. J. Moss, supra note 164, at 35.
167. President George Bush's reaction to the flag burning decision was an immediate call
for a constitutional amendment. See President Will Propose Amendment to Overturn Flag-
Burning Decision, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2236, 2236 (June 28, 1989) (quoting President
Bush: "Support for the First Amendment need not extend to desecration of the American
flag."). The amendment would have exempted any symbolic speech involving the national flag
from the freedom of speech clause of the first amendment. See Lewis, Happy Birthday, N.Y.
Times, July 2, 1989, at E13, col. 1. Supporting the President's position, the American Society
for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property held a patriotic march down a busy street
in Miami, Florida in August 1989. The paraders, 30 strong, carried a towering American flag
accompanied by this message: "Amend the Constitution: Save the Honor of the Flag."
Supporting the Flag, Miami Herald, Aug. 31, 1989, at IB, col. 1 (photograph and caption).
Legislators, however, declined to follow the President's lead. Green, Senate Kills Flag-Burning
Amendment, Miami Herald, Oct. 20, 1989, at IA, col. 1; Flag.Protection Amendment Dealt
Setback in Senate, Miami Herald, Oct. 18, 1989, at 12A, col. 1; see also Tribe, Testimony
presented on July 18, 1989 before the Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee during the course of hearings on the desecration of the American
flag, reprinted in CONG. DIG., Aug.-Sept. 1989, at 215 (advocating the passage of a federal
statute rather than a constitutional amendment to handle the flag burning controversy: "On
its 200th birthday, the Bill of Rights deserves a better present than a needless amendment.").
Even cartoonist Garry Trudeau joined the constitutional amendment fray. His November 5,
1989 Doonesbury strip showed an oversized picture of the American flag with this brain-teaser:
"Try disposing of today's ¢omix section without violating George Bush's proposed
constitutional amendment on flag desecrationl Sure, this flag's only paper, but it's still our
Nation's Symboll Solution? There is none! You're stuck with this flag until it crumbles!"
Miami Herald, Nov. 5, 1989, (Comics), at 1. On June 26, 1990, the flag amendment died
legislatively when the Senate's vote fell short of the required two-thirds. Hess, Flag
Amendment Fails Senate Test, Miami Herald, June 27, 1990, at 3A, col. 1. The vote was
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character of flag burning, or any other form of flag desecration, lends
largely ceremonial because the House had already rejected the amendment the prior week. Id.
The controversy, however, will continue to play a role in the political arena, especially when
legislators' records come under scrutiny in next fall's elections. Id.
The negative impact of flag desecration on people's sensibilities also comes into play in
artistic expression involving the flag. See, e.g., People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 117, 257
N.E.2d 30, 31, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971) (art gallery
proprietor convicted of displaying "protest art" using the American flag, inter alia, "in the
form of the male sexual organ, erect and protruding from the upright member of a cross"); see
also D'Amato & Fein, Censorship: Is 'The, Flag on the Floor' Valid Speech?, 75 A.B.A. J. 42
(1989) (arguing for and against the proposition: Is "the flag on the floor" valid speech?);
Hochfield, Flag Furor, ARTNEws, Summer 1989, at 43 (describing the controversy that arose
from the exhibition of Scott Tyler's What Is the Proper Way to Display a U. Flag? at the
School of the Art Institute of Chicago; visitors were invited to write their answers on a ledger
placed on a shelf, but to get to the shelf, visitors had to step on an American flag).
Although the United States Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson did not address the
validity of the federal flag desecration statute, Congress reacted to the decision by amending
the statute in an attempt to eliminate its perceived constitutional infirmity. The Flag
Protection Act of 1989, enacted on October 28, 1989, amended 18 U.S.C. § 700. The Flag
Protection Act provides:
FLAG PROTECTION ACT OF 1989
An Act to amend section 700 of title 18, United States Code, to protect the
physical integrity of the flag.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatitves of the United
States of America in Congress assembled.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Flag Protection Act of 1989".
SEC. 2. CRIMINAL PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE
PHYSICAL INEGRITY OF THE UNITED STATES FLAG.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (a) of section 700 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(a)(l) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns,
maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
"(2) This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal
of a flag when it has become worn or soiled."
(b) DEFINITION.-Section 700(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
"(b) As used in this section, the term 'flag of the United States': means any
flag of the United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance, of any size,
in a form that is c6mmonly displayed."
SEC. 3. EXPEDITED REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES.
Section 700 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following:
"(d)(l) An appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States from any interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order issued by a
United States district court ruling upon the constitutionality of subsection (a).
"(2) The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on the question,
accept jurisdiction over the appeal and advance on the docket and expedite to the.
greatest extent possible."
Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 1990 U.S.C.A. 103 Stat. 777, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 700 (Supp. 1990) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 700). To address the concern, that the statute, even
as amended, might fail to pass constitutional muster, Congress added Subsection d, which
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newsworthiness to the act. This sensationalist quality is part of the
message that the protestor is conveying in order to direct media atten-
tion to himself.1 68  For protestors who lack the financial means to
reach a wide audience, this potential for access to the media makes
such conduct attractive. 169 Similarly, the playing of loud rock music
is a sure-fire attention grabber. Our health-conscious society views
provides for expedited consideration of constitutional challenges by allowing appeals to be
taken directly from the district court to the Supreme Court. 135 CONG. REC. S12601 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also Yang, Senate Approves Flag Bill After It
Adds Wording that May Be Unconstitutional, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1989, at A4, col. 1. The
constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court did not take long. The test case was sched-
uled for oral argument on May 14, 1990. High Court to Rush Ruling on Flag Law, Miami
Herald, Mar. 31, 1990, at 22A, col. 3. The Court reviewed two district court rulings declaring
the flag law unconstitutional. Id. In one of the rulings, a federal district judge in Seattle,
Washington "dismiss[ed] charges against four young people who burned American flags in
defiance of the law moments after it took effect." Flag Burning Law Is Rejected: Issue Returns
to High Court, Miami Herald, Feb. 22, 1990, at lA, col. 1. According to the defendants in the
case: "IT]his battle is far from over.... This is a fight we are determined to win." Id. at 18A,
col. 1; see also Vietnam Vets Burn Flags to Protest New Law, Miami Herald, Oct. 29, 1989, at
7A, col. 1 (describing the wide range of demonstrations that took place in Seattle in response
to the flag law). The second challenge to the Flag Protection Act arose from an incident in the
nation's capital. Shortly after Congress passed the law, police arrested Scott W. Tyler and
three other protestors in front of the U.S. Capitol for torching three American flags while
chanting "burn, baby, burn." Burn, Baby, Burn, Miami Herald, Oct. 31, 1989,.at 2A, col. 3
(picture and caption). Tyler had earlier created the "flag on the floor" controversy. See
D'Amato & Fein, supra, at 42. Like the Seattle judge, the federal district judge in Washington,
D.C. declared the flag law unconstitutional and "threw out the government's case." Flag
Burning: Second U.S. Judge Rules Against Law, Miami Herald, Mar. 6, 1990, at 9A, col. 2.
The Supreme Court affirmed both district court decisions in United States v. Eichman, 58
U.S.L.W. 4744, 4746 (1990) (declaring the flag law unconstitutional on the grounds that, like
the Texas statute in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), "it suppresses expression out of
concern for its likely communicative impact").
168. For evidence of the degree of media attention that flag burning attracts, see, for
example, Achenbach, A Symbol-Minded Solution, Miami Herald, Sept. 10, 1989, Tropic
Magazine, ai 8; Toner, Spirit of 89: The Uproar over What America Owes Its First Allegiance
to, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1989, at El, col. 1; Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Protesters'Right to
Burn the Flag, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
169. See Pemberton, The Right of Access to Mass Media, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
276 (N. Dorsen ed. 1970). Mr. Pemberton expressed concern that the level of outrageousness
of the device used to attract media attention may obscure the message and, in the end,
"provide[ ] no real solution to the problem of access to the media." Id. at 281. As a result of
the use of sensational techniques to gain access to the media, "the medium-a demonstration
and the reaction to it-[becomes] the message." Id. at 279. One solution to this media access
dilemma for unconventional speakers might be a constitutionally mandated allocation of
media resources among all strata of society. The Court, however, is not likely to engage in
such an exercise in wealth redistribution. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional, on freedom of the press grounds, the Florida "right
to reply" law which granted political candidates equal space to reply to published criticism by
a newspaper). Therefore, despite its potentially adverse effect on audiences, non-establishment
speakers seeking to reach wide audiences must resort to their own devices, including
outrageous conduct, to accomplish this goal.
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noise pollution, even in musical form, as a significant evil.17 Being
subjected to loud music may affront some people as deeply as seeing
the American flag burned. Thus, the sensationalism of noisy rock
music is akin to the sensationalism of flag burning in that both activi-
ties offend high priority values.17'
Intimately related to the outrageous nature of the speakers' con-
duct in the two cases is the public setting of the conduct. Johnson
burned the flag in front of Dallas City Hall after a march through the
streets of Dallas. Rock Against Racism (RAR) concerts were
presented in New York City's Central Park. Public exposure goes
hand in hand with the attention-grabbing effect desired by the speak-
ers. Private burning of the flag would have brought no headlines.
Only in a public place can flag burning attract the media, who splash
pictures of the event on the evening news and the next morning's
front page. Similarly, RAR's playing in a less visible area than Cen-
tral Park would have reduced its message to a whisper. The intrusion
of rock music on the quiet surroundings of the Bandshell area-the
Sheep Meadow and the residences along Central Park West-brought
attention to the antiracism message. The common public settings of
the two cases is a significant factor in terms of the first amendment
doctrine of the public forum.
The facts of Ward and Johnson are also analogous because the
message that each speaker sought to convey implicated political pro-
test speech. The flag burner's message conveyed dissatisfaction with
governmental policies, specifically President Reagan's, and the social
policies of several Dallas-based corporations. The flag burner was
allegedly concerned with the effect of these policies on the threat of
nuclear war. The rock band's message conveyed dissatisfaction with
170. See Benzaia, Hold on to Your Hearing, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan./Feb. 1989, at
40 (describing the adverse effects on hearing of excessive noise exposure); Cohen, Sound Effects
on Behavior, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 1981, at 38 (analyzing the relationship between noise
and mental illness); Raloff, Noise Can Be Hazardous to Our Health, 121 Sci. NEws 377 (1982)
(part two of a comprehensive look at noise in modern society); Raloff, Occupational Noise-
The Subtle Pollutant, 121 Sci. NEWS 347 (1982) (part one of a comprehensive look at noise in
modern society); Noise Pollution: Irritant or Hazard?, HARV. MED. SCH. HEALTH LETTER,
June 1986, at I (attributing to noise both hearing damage and losses in learning ability, social
interaction, and productivity). The preoccupation with the health effects of noise is not limited
to this country. For evidence of similar concerns in Britain, see White, Britain Gets Noisier,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 1981, at 45; A Quieter Life, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1988, at 65.
171. Ironically, even the noise created by a flapping flag has created a legal controversy. A
Navy veteran was convicted of violating a noise ordinance in Las Cruces, New Mexico because
his nylon flag was flapping in the wind. A neighbor brought the complaint which resulted in
an initial conviction, but the case was overturned on appeal. Judge Throws out Conviction in
Case over a Flapping Flag, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1989, at A10, col. 6; Old Glory, Long May You
Wave, But in Las Cruces Do So Quietly, Wall St. J., July 5, 1989, at BI, col. 1.
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social conditions, specifically racism. In terms of content, both
messages are entitled to the same degree of first amendment protec-
tion. Indeed, during the 1960's civil rights protest period, the Court
repeatedly protected civil rights activists, thereby ensuring that the
antiracist message was heard.
172
Finally, both cases presented a challenge to the validity of local
laws on first amendment grounds.1 71 Johnson questioned the validity
of Texas' flag desecration statute. Rock Against Racism (RAR) dis-
puted New York City's Sound Amplification Guidelines (SAG) for
users of the Bandshell. The Texas statute challenged by Johnson pro-
hibited using the flag as a symbol for conveying political messages if
such use physically mistreated the flag in a way that offended
others. 74 By interfering with Johnson's expression of his political
views, the Texas statute ran afoul of the first amendment.175  Simi-
larly, the New York SAG challenged by RAR interposed the city's
sound amplification system and technician between the band and the
audience, thereby making the city a participant in RAR's musical
expression." 6  New York's interference with musical expression
172. See, eg., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (declaring a Birmingham
parade permit ordinance unconstitutional in the face of a challenge that was spearheaded by
the 1963 Good Friday civil rights protest march in Birmingham; several black ministers,
including the petitioner, Rev. Shuttlesworth, led the march); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111
(1969) (reversing the conviction of civil rights leader Dick Gregory for leading a protest picket
to the home of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(overturning convictions under a breach of the peace statute arising from a 1500-strong mass
demonstration by blacks in a predominantly white business district); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversing the conviction of 187 picketing black students under a
breach of the peace statute); see also H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 1, at 96-105.
173. The incorporation of the first amendment into the fourteenth occurred in Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
174. For the text of the Texas statute, see supra note 19.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
176. Rock Against Racism's brief provided the technical basis for this assertion by
reproducing parts of the testimony given by its own sound engineer at trial. The engineer
described his function at the mixing desk--"a console that combines multiple signals into one
signal which is then fed into a sound system"---as "part of the band, because I am balancing all
of their instruments together to sound right to their taste." Brief for Respondent at 6, Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (No. 88-226). Asked to "approximate how
many different individual variations there are for a song," the engineer replied: "Well, I have
somewhere between 200 and 300 separate adjustments that can be made, and during the course
of a song my hands will be moving all over the board continually, constantly making
adjustments." Id. at 7. In reply to the question of whether "manipulation of the dials
require[d] any type of artistic understanding," the engineer answered:
Absolutely. For instance when you have a concert where there is [sic]
several different types of music available one has to have a very deep
understanding of what a reggae audience or a reggae band would want other than
a folk type band. In other words in a reggae type of thing the high hat is
supposed to be louder than in any other type of band and the bass guitar is
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under the guise of noise regulation was no less violative of the first
amendment than Texas' impingement on the flag burner's expressive
conduct under the guise of flag protection.
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE Two CASES
Despite the substantive similarities discussed in the previous Sec-
tion, the two cases yielded opposite results. This Section examines the
Court's opinion in each case, noting the Court's lack of sensitivity
toward the speaker in the park concert case. The Comment concludes
that this lack of sensitivity in applying first amendment tests, which
may in fact be inextricably related to the chosen test, is the source of
the inconsistent results.
A. Achieving Consistent Results
Equally situated speakers deserve equal protection under the first
amendment. This consistency may be achieved in one of two ways:
by protecting or by silencing the speakers. One of the intriguing fea-
tures of the two cases discussed in this Comment is that each decision
was accompanied by a strong dissent."' Examining the majority
opinion of each case in conjunction with the other's dissent highlights
the arguments for consistency, whether it favors or hurts the speaker.
1. PROTECT THE SPEAKER
The flag burner and the rock band were similarly situated in
terms of their unconventional positions. 7M These positions prompted
them to resort to outrageous methods in order to get their messages
across. In a society where the means of communication are con-
trolled by the established media, headline grabbing conduct is de
rigueur for the effective protestor. Tolerance of speakers' unorthodox
supposed to be very dominant and very boomy and when you go to the next band
they want a completely different setup.
Id. Testimony from the city's sound expert on cross-examination corroborated this assessment
of the role of a sound mixer by adding that "the most important factor in the accurate and
aesthetic reproduction of amplified music is the individual working the sound board or mixing
board." Id at 8 (citation omitted).
177. Chief Justice Rehnquist, together with Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia, joined
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Ward v. Rock Against Racism; Justice Blackmun
concurred in the judgment; and Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens dissented. Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2750 (1989). In Texas v. Johnson, Justice Brennan
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia; Justice
Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion; and Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, while Justice Stevens filed an additional
dissent. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
178. For a discussion of these similarities, see supra Section II.
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methods in these situations would insure that they are heard, thereby
vindicating the three widely accepted theories underlying the first
amendment-the search for truth embodied in the "marketplace of
ideas" metaphor; 17 9 the need for a free flow of ideas without which
self-government is impossible;I1 0 and the notion that personal liberty
and self-actualization require the ability to express oneself1 '-as well
as a complementary fourth value-"checking the abuse of power by
public officials."
18 2
These first amendment values were in fact vindicated in the
Texas v. Johnson decision. Protecting the flag burner's message
179. Justice Holmes endorsed this theory in his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919):
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
Id at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The origins of the concept as a justification for free speech
date back to John Milton's Areopagitica, A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the
Parliament of England (1644):
And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt
her strength. Let her and Fashood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the
wors in a free and open encounter?
J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 51-52 (. Hales ed. 1949).
John Stuart Mill also advocated the open search for truth:
But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing
the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they
are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose,
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth, produced by its collision with error.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) 20 (S. Collini ed. 1989).
180. The key proponent of this justification was the noted philosopher Alexander
Meiklejohn, who wrote: "These conflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, not
because they are valid, but because they are relevant. ... To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to
be unfit for self-government." A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 106, at 28.
181. In his recent book, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech, C. Edwin Baker advances
this theory as a replacement for the "marketplace of ideas" which he finds unpersuasive. C.
BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3-5 (1989).
182. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
521, 527. Professor Blasi argues that this value, as compared to the three traditionally
acknowledged values, better addresses the free speech demands asserted by post-civil rights
and anti-war protest groups. "The need for fresh thinking at the theoretical level is all the
more imperative because many of the First Amendment claims of powerful movements and
institutions can be granted only at considerable cost to competing social and individual
interests." Id at 525. These interests include "individual reputation, adjudicative fairness,
efficient public administration, and peace and quiet." Id (footnotes omitted).
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ensured its access to the marketplace of ideas. Because the message
was political, it fell within the category of messages that should be
heard by a self-governing society. Moreover, the flag burner's expres-
sion of his political views was an exercise in self-actualization. In
terms of the traditional justifications for the first amendment, there-
fore, the Court was correct in protecting Johnson. Finally, protecting
Johnson's expression against President Reagan's policies served the
checking value of the first amendment. Absent this protection, it
becomes easier for an administration to abuse its power by imposing
its own policies on an uninformed and possibly unwilling citizenry.
In its analysis of Texas' assertion that enforcement of such a stat-
ute was constitutional, the Court addressed the two interests that
Texas advanced to support its claim.' 3 On the facts of the Johnson
case, the Court found that Texas' first interest-"preventing breaches
of the peace"--could not be sustained.'" The only evidence that
Texas adduced in support of this interest consisted of the testimony of
witnesses who were "seriously offended" by Johnson's act. 85 These
seriously offended witnesses, the Court argued, were not likely to
breach the peace. As it had done in Street, the Court set the breach of
the peace standard at Brandenburg's "incitement to imminent lawless
action"'8 6 and Chaplinsky's "fighting words,"'" 7 thereby finding seri-
ous offense wanting."'
Texas' second interest-"preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity"' 8 9-fared no better when subjected to
the switching function of the O'Brien test. In Spence, the Court had
already declared a state's. interest in preserving the flag's symbolic
value to be "directly related to expression."'90 To buttress this asser-
tion, the Court in Johnson presented a reductio ad absurdum argu-
ment: Unless the flag desecrator is trying to convey a message, there
is no reason for the state to proffer an interest implicating the flag's
symbolic value-the messages for which the flag should stand; if the
flag desecrator is conveying a message, however, then the state's
asserted interest necessarily implicates expression.' 9'
After determining that Johnson's symbolic speech in burning the
183. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2541-47 (1989).
184. Id at 2541.
185. Id
186. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
188. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
189. Id
190. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974) (per curiam).
191. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542-43.
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American flag fell outside the ambit of the O'Brien -test,'92 the Court
switched its level of analysis to a stricter scrutiny track, indeed, the
"most exacting scrutiny."' 9  When subjected to these rigorous
requirements, the state's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity failed to justify Johnson's criminal
conviction for burning the flag. 194 The Court cited an array of prece-
dents for the proposition that "the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offen-
sive or disagreeable."'' 19 Relying primarily on Street and Barnette, the
Court refused to except the flag from this principle. 96 The Court
concluded that the state may not inhibit expressive conduct involving
the flag. To allow the state to appropriate the flag as a symbol and
limit its use to the expression of state-approved messages would lead
into a "territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries." 19"'
Ultimately, the Court predicted, the state could impose political views
on the citizenry in direct contravention of the first amendment. 9
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Johnson states: "It is
poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in
contempt."' 199 These words reiterate the burdensome reality of what
true commitment to the principles of the first amendment entails and
echo Justice Jackson's remarks in Barnette concerning the emotional
difficulty of adjudicating flag cases.2°°
The logic of the majority opinion's arguments compels the con-
clusion that the flag burning case was decided correctly. Consistency
in first amendment adjudication compels the conclusion that the park
concert case should also have been decided in favor of the speaker.
Applying the underlying theories of the first amendment to the park
concert case reaffirms this conclusion. Protecting the rock band's
antiracist, hence political, message would have vindicated both the
marketplace of ideas and the self-government values of the first
amendment by letting the idea compete for acceptance against oppos-
ing ones. In terms of the liberty notion, the rock band's musical per-
formance constituted an act of self-expression and, therefore, self-
actualization. Moreover, by publicly challenging racist policies,
192. Id at 2542.
193. Id at 2543 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
194. Id at 2548.
195. Id at 2544.
196. Id
197. Id at 2546.
198. Id
199. Id at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring separately).
200. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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RAR's conduct served to "check" governmental furtherance of such
policies. Thus, promotion of the checking value of the first amend-
ment called for upholding the group's free speech demands, even
when one of the interests at stake was "peace and quiet."20'
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism advocated a decision in favor of the speaker. While accepting
the majority's application of the Clark test, the dissent took issue with
the majority's method for determining whether a regulation is nar-
rowly tailored. 20 2 Rather than requiring judicial scrutiny of less
restrictive alternatives available to the city of New York for regulat-
ing volume in Bandshell concerts, the majority sanctioned judicial
deference to the city's rational determination of how to accomplish its
goal.20 3 If the courts may not look at alternative methods of achiev-
ing the state interest, the dissent asked, how are they to determine if
the regulation is in fact narrowly tailored?2°4 The dissent concluded
that, on this analysis, a city's banning of handbilling would pass con-
stitutional muster merely on the basis of the city's assertion that it
was the most effective means to achieve the goal of having a clean
city.20 The repercussion of this doctrinal shift is a lowered level of
first amendment protection for public forum speakers.' °  This is an
ironic result given the origins of the doctrine, which advocated that
use of the public forum "must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.
'20 7
The dissent raised an even stronger point of contention: the prior
restraint characteristics of the city regulations. 208 The dissent stated
201. See supra note 182. For diverging views regarding the noise complaints generated by
Rock Against Racism's performances, see supra note 149.
202. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2761 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
203. See id at 2759..
204. Id at 2762.
205. Id. The dissent was analogizing to early public forum cases. The majority called this
analogy "imaginative but misguided." Id at 2758 n.7.
206. Id at 2762-63.
207. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939); see also supra text accompanying notes 105-
16.
208. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2763 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "The concept of prior restraint,
roughly speaking, deals with official restrictions imposed upon speech or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication." Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 648 (1955). Professor Emerson ascribed the articulation of
the doctrine to Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Emerson,
supra, at 649. The key passage from Near discussed the instances when protection from prior
restraint is not unlimited, such as wartime publication of troop movement information,
obscenity, incitement to acts of violence, and overthrow of the government by force; the
passage then went on to state: "The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong
light the general conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by
the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from
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that although the city regulations purported to seek "appropriate
sound quality,"' 9 the city effectively provided a censor by placing a
city technician at the sound amplification controls.2 10 Determining
the constitutionality of a prior restraint system requires closer scru-
tiny than that accorded by the majority. 211 The majority accepted the
city's goal without stopping to inquire what guided the technician in
achieving the city's objective during a live concert, notwithstanding
the city's promise of prior consultation with the concert sponsors.21 2
The dissent concluded that the decision effectively condoned a prior
restraint, thereby eviscerating the first amendment.213
The result in Ward v. Rock Against Racism may also be criticized
as anomalous in light of the similarities, discussed above, between the
flag burning case and the park concert case. The two cases presented
substantively comparable first amendment demands. 214  Through
selective application of tests, however, the cases yielded contrary
results. The majority in the flag burning case properly applied the
O'Brien test to make a threshold determination that the Texas statute
was content based. This determination led to "switching" the flag
burner out of the O'Brien test and onto a higher level of first amend-
ment protection.215 In the park concert case, however, a different
majority 16 characterized the fact pattern as a public forum scenario
previous restraints or censorship." Near, 283 U.S. at 716. From a historical perspective, the
first amendment reflected the widespread abhorrence of licensing acts through which the
English Crown had attempted to control the printing press. Emerson, supra, at 650-51; see
also Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECHIN THE UNITED STATES 9-12 (1948) (tracing the Blackstonian
view that the free speech clause applied only to prior restraints). Indeed, historians postulate
that the original purpose of the first amendment was no more and no less than the prohibition
of prior restraints. Emerson, supra, at 652. Not until the twentieth century did the United
States Supreme Court clarify this issue by extending the protection of the first amendment to
free speech infringement arising from "subsequent punishment." Id. Credit for deciding the
subsequent punishment issue goes to Justice Holmes in the seminal first amendment case,
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Emerson, supra, at 652 n.15. Although the
prior restraint doctrine has been a mainstay of first amendment adjudication since the Near
decision in 1931, commentators have criticized its categorizing tendencies as misleading. See,
e.g., Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70
VA. L. REv. 53, 55 (1984).
209. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at .2764. The dissent argued, however, that musical expression
cannot be divorced from sound quality because the way the music tones are mixed and




212. Id at 2764.
213. Id at 2765.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 163-76.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 192-94.
216. See supra note 177.
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and proceeded to apply the Clark test, employing a narrow equal pro-
tection level of scrutiny. 217 In applying the Clark test, the Court com-
pletely bypassed a situation-sensitive, individualized evaluation of the
rock band's message, an evaluation afforded to the flag burner.218 The
Court did not take into consideration the band's unconventional posi-
tion when evaluating the city's proferred interest in sound quality
during Bandshell events.21 9 Indeed, the Court dismissed the rock
band's claim that the city's requirements impinged on artistic expres-
sion, hence on message content.220 In so doing, the Court failed to
protect legitimate first amendment claims of a rock band only one day
after upholding similar claims in the controversial flag burning
decision.
2. SILENCE THE SPEAKER
An alternative approach to achieving consistency between the
two cases is to support the silencing of both speakers. In this view,
the park concert case was decided correctly, but the flag burning case
was decided incorrectly. Chief Justice Rehnquist, by concurring in
the park concert case and authoring the dissent in the flag burning
case, advocated this position.
As a preliminary step to deciding Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
217. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21. Indeed, even the dissent endorsed this
level of analysis: "The Guidelines indisputably are content-neutral as they apply to all
Bandshell users irrespective of the message of their music." Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2761
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
218. The Court determined that the Sound Amplification Guidelines were content neutral
by looking at the city's purpose in issuing the guidelines: noise control and sound quality.
Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2754. Although noise control may be said to be facially neutral, Justice
Black's words of caution regarding noise regulations should be kept in mind. See infra text
accompanying note 268. Sound quality, on the other hand, necessarily implies a value
judgment. It is difficult to see how government views on what constitutes good sound could be
divorced from the imposition of regulations to achieve good sound. Moreover, a rock band's
notion of sound quality might not coincide with a government's notion. By evaluating the
city's interests in noise control and sound quality in a generalized public forum context,
however, the Court failed to detect any conflict between the government's purpose and the
rock band's message.
219. In analyzing the city's interest, the Court did not accept RAR's argument that
imposition of the city's sound equipment and technician for the purpose of ensuring sound
quality amounted to enforcement of a "bureaucratically determined, value-laden conception of
good sound." Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2754.
220. The Court argued: "The city has disclaimed in express terms any interest in imposing
its own view of appropriate sound mix on performers. To the contrary, as the District Court
found, the city requires its sound technician to defer to the wishes of event sponsors
concerning sound mix." Id As noted in the dissent, the majority completely ignored the
potential for deviation, during the performance itself, between the concert sponsors' wishes
and the technician's real-time mixing and controlling of sounds prior to feeding them to the
sound amplification system. Id at 2764.
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the United States Supreme Court classified the site of the rock con-
cert, the Naumberg Bandshell in New York City's Central Park, as a
public forum.221 The Court then analyzed the city's imposition of
Sound Amplification Guidelines (SAG) in light of the allowable time,
place, and manner restrictions most recently articulated in Clark.
222
The Clark test requires: (1) that restrictions be justified without refer-
ence to the content of the regulated speech; (2) that they be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the infor-
mation.223 The Court considered each of these requirements seriatim.
First, the Court found the SAG to be content neutral.224
According to the Court, the city's two justifications for the SAG, to
control noise levels and to ensure the quality of sound, had nothing to
do with content.225 The Court dismissed the argument advanced by
Rock Against Racism (RAR) that the SAG amounted to interference
with artistic judgment by pointing to the requirement that the techni-
cian defer to the wishes of event sponsors concerning sound mix.
226
The Court also found the SAG to be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, the second requirement of the Clark
test.227 The Court looked at two aspects of sound control in evaluat-
ing the substantiality of the governmental interest advanced by the
SAG. Primarily, the city sought to protect its citizens from unwel-
come noise caused by excessively loud performances. 22 The city also
sought to ensure adequate amplification levels so. that concert goers
could enjoy Bandshell performances.229 Both goals, the Court
argued, met the substantiality test.230 To advance these interests
without running afoul of the Clark test, however, the city's guidelines
had to be narrowly tailored. According to the Court, the SAG met
this requirement by not being substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the interest.231 On the record, the Court determined that the
SAG served the city's interest in a direct and effective way.232 The
221. Id. at 2753.
222. Id.
223. Id
224. Id. at 2754-56.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2754.
227. Id at 2756.
228. Id
229. Id at 2757.
230. Id. at 2756-57.
231. Id. at 2758.
232. Id at 2759.
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Clark test, the Court stated, required no more.233 The court of
appeals' diligent search for alternative regulatory methods against
which to measure the SAG was not required in the context of the
Clark test.234 The court should have deferred to the city's reasonable
determination of the best way to accomplish the goal of sound
control.235
The Court concluded its analysis with the statement that the
SAG easily met the third Clark requirement-leaving open ample
alternative channels of communication.236 Use of the Bandshell was
still available to RAR, albeit within the circumscribed guidelines.237
Absent a showing that remaining avenues were inadequate, the Court
refused to consider objections on these grounds.238
In addition to rejecting Rock Against Racism's free speech
claims, the Court's conservative segment 239 offered strong arguments
against the flag burning decision through Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion. Quoting Justice Holmes' assertion that "a page of
history is worth a volume of logic,"'2 ° Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Texas v. Johnson marshalled pages of history to counteract the major-
ity's inescapable logic. Justice Rehnquist traced the flag's role in
American history from the Revolutionary War to the Vietnam
War.241 He also recounted the flag's role in our daily lives from its
appearance in eighty-six postal stamps to the pledge of allegiance.242
This preamble was aimed at supporting the Smith v. Goguen and
Spence v. Washington arguments, discussed in Section II, that as a
"visible symbol embodying our Nation,1 243 the flag should be
exempted from competition in the "marketplace of ideas,"'244 hence
placed outside the scope of first amendment scrutiny.
Having accorded the flag this unique symbolic status, Justice
Rehnquist proceeded to argue that the flag must accrue special prop-
erty rights, which the states and Congress may protect.245 According
to Justice Rehnquist, this is no different than granting the United
233. Id. at 2757.
234. Id. at 2759.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2760.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See supra note 177.
240. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
241. Id. at 2549-51.
242. Id. at 2551.
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States Olympic Committee exclusive rights over the use of the word
"Olympic" 246 or upholding a news agency's property rights in the
news it acquires as a result of organization and the expenditure of
labor, skill, and money."'
Justice Rehnquist failed to convince the Court that his "special
property" theory could trump any first amendment concerns arising
from prohibiting the use of the flag to convey "undesirable" political
messages. This approach of carving an area out of first amendment
protection, however, spearheaded the drive for a flag amendment. 248
B. Manipulating the Tests
One wonders how the decisions in Ward and Johnson would have
come out if the Court had reversed the test it used in each case. After
all, Justice Brennan stated in Texas v. Johnson that both the Clark
and O'Brien tests are aimed at the same threshold determination: Is
the regulation content based?249 Put another way, is the government
regulating the speech because of what the speaker is saying? Indeed,
the Second Circuit treated the two tests as interchangeable when it
borrowed the least restrictive alternative language from O'Brien in
applying the Clark test to invalidate the Sound Amplification Guide-
lines in the park concert case.
250
It is not difficult to picture the scenario of deciding Texas v.
Johnson under the Clark test. Johnson marched down the streets of
Dallas and burned the flag in front of City Hall. He was in a public
forum. In the public forum setting, the Court applies the Clark test.
246. Id. (citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522 (1987)).
247. Id. (citing International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)). On the
surface, the concept of a special property right appears reasonable. According to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the state may assert these rights for the flag. Id. But aren't the American people,
rather than the state, the ones who earned this property right through 200 years of labor? And
isn't the flag desecrator one of the people? The fatal flaw of substituting the state for the
people as right-owner reveals exactly the dangerous course down which such conceptualization
leads, the very danger that the first amendment was designed to prevent. This fallacy arises
more clearly in Justice Stevens' separate dissent. Id. at 2555 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens analogized flag desecration to writing graffiti on a public monument, id. at 2556, or to
extinguishing the eternal flame at John F. Kennedy's tomb, id. at 2557 n.*. The point missed
by Justice Stevens' discussion is that the state, as representative of the people, may claim a
property interest in public monuments or historical treasures, such as the flag made by Betsy
Ross. But the state, as representative of the people, may not claim a monopoly in the ways in
which people express views through the use of the flag as a symbol without running afoul of
the first amendment. The people of the United States "are, it is true, 'the governed.' But they
are also 'the governors.'" Meiklejohn, supra note 4, at 253-54.
248. See supra note 167.
249. See supra note 122.
250. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Applying the Clark test to the Texas statute in the same manner that
the Court applied it in Ward would have yielded the result that the
statute was content neutral. Content neutrality would have been sup-
ported by the fact that all flag burners were equally punishable under
the statute, without regard to the various messages that they might
wish to convey. 251 Having found the Texas flag desecration statute to
be content neutral, the Court would have proceeded to the next phase
* of the* Clark test: determining if the statute was a reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation; if it was narrowly tailored; and if it left
open ample alternatives for communication.252 Under the standard of
judicial deference announced in Ward, the only question would have
been whether the statute represented Texas' reasonable determination
of how best to accomplish its goals.25 3 In view of the flag's symbolic
meaning, it is perfectly reasonable for Texas to pursue its avowed
interests in "preventing breaches of the peace ' 254 and "preserving the
flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity"'255 by prohibiting
flag desecration. Moreover, in light of these lowered standards, the
statute also easily met the additional requirement that the state leave
ample alternatives for communication. Johnson was free to convey
his disagreement with the government's policies through expressive
conduct not involving the flag.256 Thus, by applying the Clark test,
the Court could have decided the flag burning case against the
speaker.
Conversely, the Court could have applied the O'Brien test to the
New York City park concert regulation. In this scenario, the thresh-
old inquiry would have been whether the city regulation was interfer-
ing with the content of speech. That is, would placing a technician
provided by the city at the sound amplification controls have, by defi-
nition, interfered with musical expression, which is protected speech?
The inextricable relationship between musical expression and sound
251. This is similar to saying that all concert sponsors in Ward were subject to the city's
guidelines regardless of the type of music they played. "[T]he city's equipment and its sound
technician could meet all of the standards requested by the performers, including RAR."
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2755 (1989). This equal protection standard,
however, reduces the level of protection afforded to the public forum speaker vis-a-vis a
speaker whose place of conduct is not taken into account. See supra notes 116-21 and
accompanying text.
252. See supra text accompanying note 120.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 227-35.
254. See supra text accompanying note 184.
255. See supra text accompanying note 189.
256. Obviously, the media-attraction quality of this alternative would have been null. The
Ward Court, however, did not seem concerned with the access-to-the-media problems
encountered by non-establishment speakers. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
1070
FLAG BURNING YES, LOUD MUSIC NO
amplification supports such a determination.2 "' Having failed the
content neutrality test, the case would have fallen out of the O'Brien
test into a stricter scrutiny track.25 This level of scrutiny would have
required weighing the city's alleged interest in preserving quiet in
both the park areas and the neighborhood surrounding the Bandshell
against the rock band's first amendment right to convey an antiracist
message. Having sacrificed the patriotic symbolism of the flag on the
altar of government protest speech, the Court would have been hard
pressed to refuse to sacrifice a few hours of peace and quiet, once a
year, on the altar of racial protest speech.259
The foregoing exercise lends credence to the notion that the
Court's choice of tests in first amendment adjudication might be out-
come determinative. By selecting the O'Brien test to switch the flag
burner onto a strict scrutiny track, Justice Brennan, a strong advocate
of first amendment rights, 62 ensured that the flag burner received
maximum first amendment protection. By selecting the Clark test
and weakening it, Justice Kennedy, who had reluctantly concurred in
the flag burning case,261 ensured that the rock band remained outside
first amendment protection. This notion, however, stands the first
amendment on its head. The legitimacy of constitutional adjudication
resides in the Court's ability to ground its results in objective histori-
cal, linguistic, and analytical methods of interpretation.262 The
257. Counsel for Rock Against Racism advanced this argument, albeit unsuccessfully:
This case is not about the regulation of "noise," but rather petitioners' attempt to
control "artistic expression."... Local authorities should no more be permitted
to tell musicians or concert promoters what kind of sound system they can use or
who can operate it than they should be permitted to instruct painters what colors
to use or authors what words to write.
Brief for Respondent at 12, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (No. 88-
226). In characterizing the city's Sound Amplification Guidelines, the brief called them
"analogous to (a) requiring the publisher of a newspaper to have a governmental agent control
its presses to stop undesirable material from being printed or (b) mandating the owner of a
radio station to have a state operator reduce or eliminate its signal for the same reason." Id. at
14 n.7.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
259. See supra note 182.
260. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, expressed the view "that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
261. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
262. See I. Stotzky, General Reflections on the Fourth Amendment and Its Literature
(Mar. 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (available from Professor Stotzky at the University of
Miami School of Law); see also Mentschikoff & Stotzky, Law-The Last of the Universal
Disciplines, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 695, 703 (1986) (discussing the role of the law in society and
the cultural tools that lawyers use to fulfill that role); Stotzky & Swan, Due Process
Methodology and Prisoner Exchange Treaties: Confronting an Uncertain Calculus, 62 MINN.
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manipulation of tests to achieve desired results robs the Court of legit-
imacy by tainting its decisions with the shadow of expediency.
To protect the legitimacy of the judicial process, the use of tests
in first amendment adjudication must be sensitive and thoughtful, not
outcome oriented or mechanical. In Kovacs v. Cooper,2 63 Justice
Frankfurter complained about "how easy it is to fall into the ways of
mechanical jurisprudence through the use of oversimplified formu-
las.' ' 264 When submerged in the application of these formulas, it is
dangerous for adjudicators not to resurface and regain sight of the
fact that the first amendment guarantees one substantive right-free-
dom of speech. The speaker is entitled to have this right safeguarded,
regardless of the location of its exercise. Sensitivity to the speaker,
even if he acts or sounds outrageous, is essential to avoid abridging
first amendment rights. Effective line drawing, as required by the first
amendment tradition, must be a thoughtful and fluid process. While
grounding itself in the rich soil of precedent, the Court must soar to
meet the continuing challenge of reconciling society's priorities vis-a-
vis individual freedoms.265
V. CONCLUSION
Noise, like flag burning, upsets people. But, noise, like flag burn-
ing, may be the only means available to draw attention to an idea.
Although the interest of society in peace and quiet is indeed compel-
ling, the gut reaction of finding noise offensive may lead to overregula-
tion of the potential noise maker. Nevertheless, both the flag burner
and the rock musician are using cultural tools to express an idea; they
are exercising their right to political protest by means of symbols.
With modern means of global communication, the media, rather than
the soap box on the street corner, is the way for the marketplace of
L. REv. 733, 749-65 (1978) (applying these concepts to due process issues under prisoner
exchange treaties).
263. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
264. Id at 96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
265. Professor Harry Kalven's view of the first amendment tradition reflected this fluidity.
It incorporated T.S. Eliot's conceptualization of literary creation as steeping oneself in the past
while articulating the present. Kalven, Foreword to H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 1, at xviii-
xxiii.
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ideas to work.266 The words of Justice Black in Saia v. New York 267
serve as a reminder of the need for tolerance towards the unconven-
tional speaker:
In this case a permit is denied because some persons were said to
have found the sound annoying. In the next one a permit may be,
denied because some people find the ideas annoying. Annoyance at
ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound, The power of censor-
ship inherent in this type of ordinance reveals it vice.
268
The flag burning case was decided correctly. The majority opin-
ion exhibited the degree of sensitivity and thoughtfulness required to
ensure that freedom of speech retains the preferred position that the
Founding Fathers accorded it. The park concert case was decided
incorrectly. The majority opinion fell into the trap of mechanically
applying a test without regard for the speaker's substantive first
amendment rights. Moreover, in applying the test, the majority also
weakened it. Hence, the negative effects of the park concert decision
are likely to extend to future first amendment decisions.
Controversies that are similar to flag burning and disturbingly
loud rock music have recently arisen with art
269 and rap lyrics.270
266. Justice Black first articulated an economic theory of the first amendment which stated
that it is just as important for first amendment freedom to keep open the inexpensive channels
of communication for non-establishment speakers as it is to protect the established media:
There are many people who have ideas that they wish to disseminate but
who do not have enough money to own or control publishing plants, newspapers,
radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show places. Yet everybody knows
the vast reaches of these powerful channels of communication which from the
very nature of our economic system must be under the control and guidance of
comparatively few people. On the other hand, public speaking is done by many
men of divergent minds with no centralized control over the ideas they entertain
so as to limit the causes they espouse. It is no reflection on the value of
preserving freedom for dissemination of the ideas of publishers of newspapers,
magazines, and other literature, to believe that transmission of ideas through
public speaking is also essential to the sound thinking of a fully informed
citizenry.
Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
267. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
268. Id at 562.
269. Robert Mapplethorpe's homoerotic art exhibit has created a national uproar. See
Coleman, Robert Mapplethorpe: Washington Project for the Arts, ARTNEwS, Oct. 1989, at 213;
Madoff, Shadowboxing with the Arts, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1989, at 204; Ferguson, Mad About
Mapplethorpe, NAT'L REy., Aug. 4, 1989, at 20.
270. The Miami, Florida musical group, 2 Live Crew, has been the focus of similar
controversy. Florida Governor Bob Martinez "ordered a statewide investigation of the
group's record company for possible violation of obscenity and racketeering laws" after calling
their lyrics "vulgar" and "disgusting." Miami Herald, Feb. 23, 1990, at IA, col. 5 (quoting
Gov. Martinez). On June 6, 1990, a federal district judge declared 2 Live Crew's recording As
Nasty As They Wanna Be legally obscene. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp.
578 (S.D. Fla. 1990). In response to the ruling, Broward County sheriff's deputies arrested
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The level of outrageousness required for access to the media27 1 led
speakers to violate society's symbolic values in the flag burning case,
antinoise-pollution environmental preferences in the park case, and
religious and sexual taboos in the explicit rap lyrics and homoerotic
art controversies. Rap lyrics, homoerotic art, and similar motifs will
present new challenges to the courts and new opportunities for line
drawing. Equitable adjudication of these cases will require sensitivity
to the unconventional speaker who relies on outrageousness to convey
his message.
ALICIA OTAZO SORONDO
two band members after a live performance of the obscene lyrics. Lutes, Charges Filed After
Raunchy Act, Miami Herald, June 11, 1990, at IA, col. 2.
271. See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
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